Innovators, Firms, and Markets

Conventional wisdom holds that robust enforcement of intellectual property (IP) right suppress competition and innovation by shielding incumbents against the entry threats posed by smaller innovators. That assumption has driven mostly successful efforts to weaken US patent protections for over a decade. This book challenges that assumption.

In Innovators, Firms, and Markets, Jonathan M. Barnett confronts the reigning policy consensus by analyzing the relationship between IP rights, firm organization, and market structure. Integrating tools and concepts from IP and antitrust law, institutional economics, and political science, real-world understandings of technology markets, and empirical insights from the economic history of the US patent system, Barnett provides a novel framework for IP policy analysis. His cohesive framework explains how robust enforcement of IP rights enables entrepreneurial firms, which are rich in ideas but poor in capital, to secure outside investment and form the cooperative relationships needed to transform a breakthrough innovation into a marketable product. The history of the US patent system and firms' lobbying tendencies show that weakening patent protections removes a critical tool for entrants to challenge incumbents that enjoy difficult-to-match commercialization and financing capacities. Counterintuitively, the book demonstrates that weak IP rights are often the best entry barrier the state can provide to protect entrenched incumbents against disruptive innovators.

By challenging common assumptions and offering a powerful integrated framework for understanding how innovation happens and the law's role in that process, Barnett's Innovators, Firms, and Markets provides important insights into how IP law shapes our economy.

"This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield difficult-to-replicate financing, production and distribution capacities. In particular, patents enable upstream firms that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that specialize in commercialization, lowering capital and technical requirements that might otherwise impede entry. These theoretical expectations track a novel organizational history of the U.S. patent system during 1890-2006. Periods of strong patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which smaller innovators can monetize R&D through financing, licensing and other relationships with funding and commercialization partners. Periods of weak patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which innovation and commercialization mostly take place within the end-to-end structures of large integrated firms. The proposed link between IP rights and organizational type tracks evidence on historical and contemporary patterns in IP lobbying and advocacy activities. In general, larger and more integrated firms (outside pharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patents, while smaller and less integrated firms (and venture capitalists who back those firms) tend to advocate for stronger patents. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the economics, history and politics of the U.S. patent system suggest that weak IP rights often shelter large incumbents from the entry threat posed by smaller R&D-specialist entities"--