Collusive Price Leadership

"Collusive Price Leadership" explores the dynamics of price leadership in oligopolistic markets. It delves into the strategic interactions between firms, focusing on how they implicitly collude to maintain stable pricing structures. The study employs game-theoretic models to analyze the conditions under which price leadership emerges and sustains itself, examining the factors that influence firms' decisions to follow or deviate from the leader's pricing.

Authored by Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner, this work offers valuable insights into the complexities of industrial organization and competitive strategy. It is essential reading for economists, business strategists, and policymakers interested in understanding the nuances of price-setting behavior in concentrated industries.

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