Britain's War for the Mediterranean examines the internal working of the British government during the crisis of the French Revolution. It focuses on how politicians, diplomats, and military commanders formulated strategy for the Mediterranean theater. One of the major conclusions of this book is that the British government never spoke with one voice. Lacking synchronization in a changing conflict, the structure and conflicting objectives of each branch of the government failed to create a coherent plan to resist Republican expansion in the region. The book complicates the simplistic view of previous works on the weakness of allies and the naivete of the Pitt ministry, providing agency to diplomats and commanders across the region.
The second major conclusion is that these conflicting objectives were firmly rooted in the experiences of the eighteenth century. British diplomacy, crippled in the aftermath of the American Revolution, saw the French Revolution as an opportunity to build consensus and a shared view of a British world. French aggression offered an opportunity to reclaim a position of influence lost over the course of the 1700s. In contrast, the trajectory of British foreign policy shaped the use of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century. A trans-Atlantic force, a war in the Mediterranean forced British admirals to relearn the complicated nature of regional foreign policy. Diplomacy and naval power clashed over the conduct of the war - one rooted in foreign courts, the other in maritime coercion.