Greece and the Cold War examines examines the 1954 crisis within NATO from the novel perspective of critical international theory and exposes the unexplored connections between dependence and nationalism in Greek foreign policy. Drawing on a wide range of American, British and Greek archival sources, it argues that nationalism and compliance with the collective interests of NATO were two irreconcilable objectives in Greek foreign policy after 1952. At the same time, the book tells the story of how the post-Civil War governments of Greece, for a variety of political, cultural and ideological reasons, treated these two objectives as essentially compatible, resulting in the adoption of a dualist policy. This self-contradictory diplomatic doctrine, which the author refers to as "dependent nationalism", lies at the heart of Greece's post-War failures both to emancipate its politics from US intervention and to peacefully end its regional dispute with Turkey over Cyprus.
The book deploys an interdisciplinary approach which brings together the diverse perspectives of diplomatic history, foreign policy analysis and political sociology.